

Projections of Philosophy

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to the unarrived and the gone

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Idea of Projection/Launch

1

Every text is a kind of projection/launch, a projection whose outcome is fundamentally unpredictable. In this sense, writing is a form of gambling. One ruminates and writes something. It is not clear in advance whether this writing is refined or vulgar, effective or insignificant, deep or superficial, and lasting or transient. Neither the author nor even others can predict or determine the fate of a text. Many a text which at first everyone considered to be historic and everlasting but did not last even a decade and were forgotten; many a text which were once called deep and today are considered absolutely vulgar and superficial; and many a text which were at first met with snicker and ridicule of critics, but today are an important chapter in the history of a civilization. Thus, like dice, text is rightly projected amidst the world and people. However, two important questions can be asked here: First, how is text produced? And second, what grants text meaning, status, or, in a word, “future”?

2

Is it really the creator of text who produces text? The answer to this question is both affirmative and negative. In one layer, text is the product of its creator. The creator of text is a moment (or focus) of the world from the heart of which text or work emerges. But on the other hand, it is clear that the creator of text does not create anything out of his¹ inner emptiness. He only transforms in his focus what he has taken from the world and turns it into text. The issue is that he does not take only his sensory data from the world, as is heard in such famous anecdotes as, the artist who is inspired by

¹ Even chapters use *he* (including this introduction, chapter 0) while odd chapters use *she*. The original text's language, Persian, does not employ gendered pronouns. —Trans. note.

his surroundings or the writer inspired by his experiences, rather, the creator of a work takes also from his world himself, his body, his mind and is himself absolutely a product. In this sense, the work's creator takes both his content and his creative power itself from the outside. Although he is the creator and owner, he is only a temporary owner and a hypothetical creator. Not only does he have nothing, but also, due to his separated independence from the world, is himself nothing. He is merely a collection of elements or forces that for some days dwell in a temporary connection and transient unity, and slap together an identity and name for themselves, and in a few more days collapse and melt into air and earth, and as a result, he himself like his works disperses into the world. In a word, the process of creating a text or work is nothing but a kind of manifestation (text) resulting from the world gathering in a hypothetical and temporary focus constructed by this very same world (self or I).

Therefore, the creator of text is neither the owner of text, nor even truly its creator. Against the creator, as a temporary identity that sooner or later collapses, it is the text that becomes permanent, and perhaps it might even make the name of its creator, the memory of the temporary identity that he was, permanent. In this sense, it is the text that is the owner and creator of the creator and grants him lasting meaning and identity.

What exactly do we mean by "projections of philosophy"? The first meaning that comes to mind is the projection of philosophy into houses and streets, probably by the author's hand. But can philosophy even be projected? Is philosophy even projectable? If we recall Hegel's account in *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, he considers philosophy to be an era that has turned into thought. Can era considered as thought be projected? Of course it can. But where to? Yes, to the era itself! However, "projections of philosophy" contains another implication as well. If we attribute the agency of the projections to philosophy itself, "projections of philosophy" are not only the projection of philosophy itself into the middle of the era and all epochs, but are also the projections made by philosophy's hand. It

is not the author, but philosophy that projects, and it projects not only the text, but also even the author himself.

3

The writings in this book are all “philosophical notes” that are projected into the middle of the world and have perched in your hands. Although most of these notes have been published previously in different manners, they have been rewritten and readjusted to be added to this collection. Perhaps the following question could be answered at some point in the past: What is the distinguishing characteristic of these texts that justifies and perhaps even necessitates their publication? However, today there is no answer to this question. There is no specific criterion for assessing and appraising such writings. Everyone has the right to attempt to publish his writings, even if he is delusional, narcissistic, garrulous, and ignorant. The fact that this person will not find a publisher to publish his work or find an audience to read it is a separate issue. Nonetheless, everyone has the right to long for publication, and it is because of this very longing for publication and passion for expression that these fragments of writing are now in your hands. History will be the judge. And given the premises introduced about the relationship between creator of a text and the text (a more detailed analysis of which is an independent note in the first chapter of the present book), after you read these texts, the creator will have no right to them. Text is like a child leaving his parent’s house after comprehending independence. Whether he will make his parents proud or bring shame to them, is henceforth beyond the parents’ will and power. This book, however, is not really a “book”, it is a book filled with fragments of writing which, although possess an order, do not conceal their fragmental aspect. This aspect, however, is to a lesser degree caused by the author’s personal choice and more so by our fragmented era, the era of decline and collapse. That which justifies attachment of explosive materials together is it becoming heavier with the aim of intensifying its destructive power so that

even if the hope for its detonation is disillusioned, it can at least serve as a heavy mass that breaks some glass, window, or head.

4

Every note is fundamentally reactionary. In other words, despite its efforts in swinging between the issue's different poles and waltzing about its boundaries, a note always has a specific audience and is a reaction to a specific stance. Therefore, it is unreasonable to expect a note to be comprehensive, and then to criticize the note from this perspective. Apparent oppositions can be attributed to different stances and perhaps even to the oppositions of the situation itself. The stance of the author's expression is interrelated with the content, consequently, an author might take a stance towards a direction and towards a different direction, an opposing stance. He might even be at war with several enemies simultaneously, and therefore he has to observe a kind of division of labor and tactical prioritization in his writing style. However, the writer must maintain his holism and internalize the opposing parties. As a result, this divergence of stances does not absolve the author of responsibility, though it is a warning to one-sided critics. Yes, author is always responsible, but not merely for what is written. What is written will be judged independently, repeatedly, and endlessly in history. He is not even responsible in the first place for the positive or negative consequences of his text, nor for it being constructive or destructive. However, he is fundamentally responsible for one thing: responsible for intensifying his writing, using all his strength, to the greatest possible extent. And in this sense, he is always guilty: guilty of his inability to be omnipotent. Author makes his weakness into speech (Logos). But we know how weakness is much more destructive than strength. Human, in this sense, is creative because of his weakness, and author, of course, forever exposed to attacks: like the fate of a father, or even better a mother, when she is targeted by the abuse of her child's plaintiffs; even years after death. Although human has

a short lifespan, he is forevermore susceptible to being held responsible for the consequences of his action. This responsibility, however, should not be used as an excuse to justify naive moral criticisms of a work. Here we must avoid any form of remorse that dulls and diminishes the intensity of author's creativity: creative creator against morality.

5

The composer of these lines knows that many philosophical names and terms are projected into the middle of these notes, without doing them justice or providing sufficient preliminary explanations for them. This, of course, is not a flaw in these notes, but reflects the nature of note-taking. In other words, if all philosophical names and terms were to be defined and interpreted, these texts would lose their notelike and impulsive nature and become similar to scientific and interpretive articles. Nonetheless, perhaps what grants the texts of this book originality is precisely their impulsive and notelike nature. These notes are the product of a specific encounter with the world that has taken place in a specific here and now, and is represented under a specific name. This, of course, does not eliminate the need for the audience to refer to the interpretive and original texts of the philosophers. One should not hold the illusion of understanding by reading a few names and terms that are projected in a note, although this illusion cannot be avoided as well. The burden of interpreting and confronting texts is on reader, the responsibility of author, however, is neither to explain and interpret further, nor to prevent misunderstanding (the very endeavor that this introduction is delusionally attempting), but only one thing: aspiring to project something intense and contentious into his era and all eras. Whether this projection induces good or evil consequences, whether it contributes to tyranny or freedom, whether it leads to our survival or the extinction of humankind, all these issues are beyond the author's command and above his duty. This is where we must go back to the famous saying above, that history will be the judge, and existence itself arranges things as it wants,

cunningly and theatrically. History, however, judges by destroying and distorting.

6

This book is not an academic research work. As a result, unlike other research texts, the author has expressed his ideas instead of numerous references to different sources and, of course, has appended those few crucial sources to the end of the book. But amid this amalgam of schools and creeds and names, it is clear that a particular character is involved and heard the most in this book: Hegel. Why mention a philosopher? Does the author intend to gain credit for himself and justify his writing by citing a person's name? Does mentioning a western philosopher bespeak an intellectual gesture or a haughty attitude? Perhaps. However, in this failed introduction, we can add that this reference is in a way paying homage to a source. A bubbling spring that has set forth a particular manner of merging forces and concepts from which we still can drink and become more thirsty and perhaps more poisoned. As I have written elsewhere: "Hegel is both the poison and the antidote. If they don't run away, the people who confront him will inevitably be poisoned. Nonetheless, taking hold of Hegel's antidote is impossible without this poisoning. Hegel's antidote lies at the heart of the most poisonous, frightening, and destructive concept of all ages, that is, 'Dialectic', which... still holds vast possibilities, that neither Hegel himself nor any of his followers or enemies can imagine their magnitude and intensity. A concept that, at the same time, humanity can still set its hopes on, and at the height of our age's inevitable obstruction and collapse of nihilism, gamble on it for the possibility of catching a glimpse of salvation through it. Of course, gambling life itself...." All the writings of this book and possibly the whole intellectual life of their author so far, no matter how deluded he might be about his production and originality, their debt to this boiling spring cannot be concealed. This debt, of course, is critical at its heart and maintains that its goal is contemplating the

obstruction of Hegelian dialectic and attempting to overcome it. And yet again, history will be the judge, but an always-incomplete judgment...

7

Writer must write with his wound. This is not a new image. But if we write with a wound, what do we actually write with? What comes out if we unstitch the wound? With which ink does the wound write? Infection and pus and a little blood. The one who writes with his wound, pours out this slimy mass so that others may also read and understand it with their wound. The crucial feat for him, however, is to represent in words not only his wound but also, through his wound, everybody's wounds. In that event, his wound would transcend and sublimate: generalization of a personal experience or suffering; and, in a word, saving the singular from its singularity by universalizing it.

However, what if the author does not remain at this stage? He can pierce deeper with the razor, surpass the pus and infection, and write with his own blood, with limpid red blood. This is where there is no need to squeeze if he has gone deep enough. It is the blood itself that springs, that is "projected", that "projects". Moreover, it should not be forgotten that the way to reach this "projection" is through pus. The pus must be emptied. Representation of superficial wounds should be experienced for blood flow to erupt. But the main issue is that this pus should be emptied from the inside: The wound should be washed with blood, not water. Blood, with its eruption, selflessly washes the wound and washes away the pain.

The writings in this book were meant to be arranged accordingly (that is, from familiarity with the wound and determining its coordinates and condition, to emptying of pus and ichor, and finally projection and eruption), but the author himself knows that even in the final part, he did not have the courage nor the ability to write with his own flowing blood; perhaps because he still hopes for the wound to heal.

Chapter One

Coordinates of Projection/Launch

Obstruction

Universal idealistic battles are delusive from the outset. Battle with injustice in the world, battle with modernity, battle with tradition, battle with reason, battle with capitalism, battle with tyranny, battle with self. In these battles, there is no stance against the enemy. The offensive base itself is part of the enemy's territory and the offensive facilities themselves are a gift from the enemy. Every blow against the enemy is a kind of victory for the enemy, since from the very beginning the enemy is in me and I am in hallucination land.

However, should this fact prevent us from our battle? Is a responsible person someone who, upon realizing in the middle of the battle that her weapon is counterfeit and her bullet is dummy, raises her hand as a sign of surrender? Not at all. Surrendering or retreating in regard to the demands, hands over the realm to the enemy absolutely. Decision of radical fight, even if not real, preserves the possibilities of the New. And, of course, radical fighting is at the same time a fight against delusional gestures and slogans. Our mission in this age, that is, the age of decline of civilization and its constitutive myths, is only to preserve these possibilities. Resistance can melt any steel mask, even the deterministic mask of unyielding evil; even the armed to the teeth enemy. Resistance is preserving the capabilities that, although seem meager to us today, might be envied tomorrow. These possibilities should not be underestimated. We ourselves are not aware that the very life of those who will come depends on these very respiratory crevices, which must be kept unshut as per our inadvertent mission.

Chapter Two

Force of Projection/Launch

Philosopher in Crisis

1

Human is constantly and fundamentally living in crisis. This crisis envelopes all the aspects of his life. On the one hand, human himself is in constant crisis, and on the other, his world is in crisis; of course, these two are interdependent of each other. The idea of overcoming crisis and experiencing a serene and stress-free life is an illusion that can only be realized through deliberate ignorance; and why not? Is it not possible to live in delusion for a few days, a few years, even a lifetime, and perhaps several lifetimes for hundreds and thousands of years, even until the time of extinction? In *Human All Too Human*, Nietzsche writes: "...often upon its volcanic soil, man has laid out his little garden of happiness" (Nietzsche, 1996, p. 190).

2

Human is repulsed by crisis and eludes it. Contrary to his gestures of variety-seeking, he is under the command of Parmenides. Human is always looking for a way out of crisis: a crisis-free fantasy. Not only is crisis evil, but even more importantly, evil is crisis.

3

Although human has laid his garden upon the volcano's crater, he forgets, if he knows at all, that his garden is in danger of being destroyed at any moment. He can sunbathe near volcanic lake and dream of serenity, only if he is unaware of the existence of the volcano under his feet and the constant possibility of its eruption. He, of course, loves unawareness: and "no news is good news." But he alone cannot keep himself unaware. It is difficult to remain unaware and not see the obvious. The task of realizing this unawareness, this forgetfulness, is the responsibility of culture. "Culture" is the enemy of recollection (ἀνάμνησις).

4

The mission of recollection, however, is for the intellectual. Intellectual is the disrupter of culture: that is, disrupter of both people and state. The term “people’s intellectual” is as contradictory and pathetic as “state intellectual”. However, while necessary, recollection is not sufficient. The main issue is not endless disclosures and grumbles, but understanding the logic of the crisis. Culture attempts to distort the logic of the crisis and make it seem chaotic and calm at the same time: chaotic so that it is not comprehensible, calm so that it is not alarming. If we did not live in this concurrent contradiction ourselves, we might never have believed that someday people would live like this. It is the duty of intellectual to divulge this contradiction. But the mission of understanding the crisis’s logic is beyond the intellectual. Intellectual is constantly prone to be deceived. If he does not know the logic of the crisis, at the very moment that he wants to fight the enemy, he is played by the enemy and inadvertently becomes his force. The experience of Iranian intellectuals over the past century is a testament to this claim. This is where another figure must come into play: philosopher. Philosopher knows the self-evident, however, his duty in the deepest depths of metaphysics, is not only to “discover” the deceptions of culture and the economy of forces, but rather to “create”; creating a logic to explain and orientate the crisisful situation: to describe and prescribe. However, a superficial understanding of the role and meaning of philosopher must strictly be avoided. A professor or graduate of philosophy familiar with philosophical schools is not necessarily a philosopher, but merely a “philosophy scholar”. In short, a “philosopher” means one who thinks about his critical situation at a metaphysical level. So of course, the philosopher must be a “philosophy scholar” and be acquainted with the history of metaphysics, but not every philosophy scholar is a philosopher.

5

For thousands of years, Philosophers after Parmenides forgot/hid the logic of existence, that is, the call of Heraclitus, the essential crisis of ontology. Although today, after being released from the reign of dogmatic stabilism, this call has for some time echoed and been heard, it has practically become a tool for the enemies and, alas, again to distract our minds: The myth of our time is the very legitimization, imposition, and misrepresentation of crises by their stakeholders. This is where intellectuals also are deceived and misappropriated. This is where the voice of crisis-thinking philosophers, if born at all, is not heard nor understood due to excessive loudness; even if homes and libraries are full of books about crisis.

6

Intellectual considers himself the exposé of truth and speaks the language of the people. Philosopher, however, thinks about the meaning of truth itself and speaks the language of metaphysics. A philosopher can also play the role of an intellectual and speak two or several languages, but not just any intellectual can be a philosopher. The immediate mission of philosopher is neither to criticize the situation nor to paint an ideal situation, but precisely to explain the situation itself, the crisis itself, and to create a logic for understanding its problematic.

7

The ontological acknowledgment of crisis is, of course, exhausting. Human beings have unknowingly built their “house of happiness” in the crater of volcano and their lives on the pillars of crisis. Their unawareness of this is not incidental, but the essential condition for their happiness: the necessary condition for preserving civilization and society. “There can be neither society nor culture without untruth... everything which is good and beautiful depends upon illusion” (Nietzsche, 1979, p. 92).

8

Although Nietzsche's reference to building a house in the volcano's crater is at first descriptive and general, from another perspective it also has a prescriptive and particular aspect to it. Everyone has built their house of happiness in the crater of volcano, but it is the philosopher who, while acknowledging the fragility of his house of happiness, instead of trying to relocate it, instead of abandoning it in the hopes of finding a house that is safe, must rather face his crisis and build his house while conscious of its fragile foundation and stay vigilant. Unlike others, he consciously takes risk, lives crisis and accepts it as if it were his destiny, and in crisis thinks about the bases of crisis. Therefore, while Nietzsche in the mentioned phrase from *Human All Too Human* describes the underlying crisis in the foundation of all human beings, in *The Gay Science* he addresses the philosopher in an explicitly prescriptive manner: "Build your cities on the slopes of Vesuvius!" (Nietzsche, 1974, p. 228). Philosopher – rather such a philosopher – is neither like most people content with his unawareness, nor does he always, like intellectual, seek to negate the crisisful situation to find a crisis-free paradise. Conscious of the inevitable logic of living in crisis, he builds house, not compulsorily but eagerly, on crisis itself, on destruction and decay itself, and makes destruction itself into the bases of his own logic. Neither in intellectual nor in critic but only in philosopher, can "negation" become the positive constitutive of truth, that is, come to such power that he can destroy destruction itself.

Chapter Three

Angle of Projection/Launch

Childlike Innocence

1

Children are scariest of human beings; they are cruel and savage animals that we tame and make them tolerable by employing a thousand tricks and repressions. Raising a child is essentially not much different from training an animal: especially before they come to speak. Teaching language to children is concurrent with culture learning and civilization of these wild animals. When children come to speak, then the primary part of nurture is over and they have been elevated from animal level to that of human (*animal rationale*). But they do not yet possess a moral conscience, and as a result they lie easily, deceive easily, commit violence easily, and even, circumstances allowing, without any guilt commit atrocity comfortably. Aside from this possibly incentivizing premise, the main question here is, why does this myth dominate our minds and culture, that we see such terrifying creatures “innocent” and “beautiful”? What seductive deception in the face of the child fascinates and blinds us? This is where we should reverse the optimistic formula of Lévinasian Face.

2

Of course, we all have been children ourselves. But when we nostalgically think of our childhood and wish for it and reminisce its joyous days, what do we really wish for? Our innocence? Our purity? None at all. Because we were not really pure and innocent then at all. We precisely wish for a return to the “freedom” and “unrestraint” of our childhood. Another name for this freedom and unrestraint is “savagery”. We, the adult civilized savages, due to all the frustrations and failures caused by our civilization and uncritical confrontation with this frustration, long to return from our post-civilized captive savagery to pre-civilized free savagery: to the childhood’s monster; to absolute freedom in its absolutely negative sense. Childhood “innocence” is a code name to hide the same savagery that, although we

might experience in certain violent moments (such as atrocity) in our adulthood, we will constantly long for for the rest of our lives. Because the sad news is that due to the formation of the structure of repression and cultural-civilizational laws, a return to pre-civilized unconscionability and savagery is no longer possible. Even for soldiers who, in the midst of blood and fire, at the moment of killing, are closer than ever to the freedom experience of their childhood.

Chapter four

Projection/Launch

Death

1. Perspective of the Individual:

Dawn of pluralism, “I”, serenity of morning

After death, the body crumbles and the celebration of worms and cannibals commences. How meaningless life is. However, “I” has to cling to hopes of eternity to endure this absurdity.

Human invented an eternal being and named it “substance” and injected it into “I” to spread the immortality of substance to “I”. I am truth, but mortal. Therefore an “I” must be created which is immortal: invention of the concept of self or individual soul.

Idea: Eternity of individual self (Plato: The possibility of life after death with the aim of justifying knowledge / Christianity: The possibility of life after death with the aim of justifying punishment).

2. Perspective of the Universal:

Absolute monism (exclusive monotheism), “he”, euphoria of midday

“I” was nothing but an illusion from the beginning. Death is the end of this illusion, an illusion that grants the status of independent substantiality to individual singularity. “I” is nothing but a temporary combination of components. Death is not the liberation of I from the body, but the liberation of the world from I, the liberation of existence from existent: the end of this temporary combination, the end of the illusion of substantiality. The truth is not I, but whole.

Idea: Eternity of universal spirit (Legacy of Parmenides: Ibn Arabi / Bruno / Spinoza).

3. Perspective of Death:

Intersubjective dynamic monism, “us”, glimmer of world’s night

“I” is nothing but a blank focus of the forces that in a particular circumstance have manifested in a particular manner. “I” is a partial and provisional manifestation of whole. But “whole” too is nothing but an intertwined system of forces and “I”s. “I that is us, and us that is I.” The I which is independent of whole, independent of others, independent of other “I”s, is just an illusion. But whole too, independent of its constitutive parts, independent of “I”s, is an illusion. They are an illusion both, I in itself and whole in itself. Every “in itself” is an illusion. Truth is revealed and realized through negation of this very in-itselfness. I indeed is the very perennial transient illusion that I have of myself as an independent being. My death is the end of this illusion, but not in favor of the positivity and eternity of an existence that is devouring, beyond, and independent of all “I”s, since this very whole is sustained by these very deaths. This whole is nothing but that which sublates and encompasses “I”s. “I”s must die so that the whole persists, so that it proceeds and lives. This whole is nothing but an intertwined assortment of “I”s that come and go and in between have their illusions sublated. However, not only death is the sublation of illusion, life too is the sublation of illusion. Death is sublation of the illusion of eternity and life is sublation of the illusion of stability. Stability and stillness belong to the realm of the dead, life is the domain of motion. But motion contains negation inside of it and negation inevitably leads to death. So death is the precondition for life and life is the precondition for death. Whole is eternal only in this sense. In other words, whole is eternal not due to being stable and immortal, instead, it is eternal because it constantly and necessarily dies and puts to death and feeds on death and is made forceful by negation. And what force is stronger than the force of negation and death?

Idea: It is only death that is alive, because it itself does not die. The truth, if it is truth, it must be alive and if it is eternal, it must be death. If truth is the

precondition for our life, our death, the death of each and every one of us, is also the precondition for life of truth. Death, in this sense, is another name for truth, another name for existence...

Silence

1

Human hearing is capable of hearing a limited range of sounds, both in terms of frequency (between 20Hz and 20kHz) and in terms of intensity (between 0 and 140dB). Outside of this range, human cannot hear sounds and consequently this inability is represented for him in the form of an absence of sensory experience of sound. We call this absence in sensory experience of hearing power “silence”. As a result, silence is in fact not a thing. Silence does not exist at all. Silence is an issue that belongs to the subject absolutely and therefore holds no ontological content. So we do not hear silence, rather, we call not hearing anything silence.

2

But is it that simple? By the same logic, can it not be said that darkness is nothing but the experience of not seeing anything? Do we not see anything when we close our eyes? Does absolute darkness mean not seeing? In that case, what happens if we stare at a black hole? Do we not see anything? Is the reason for this experience, our visual system’s inability to see darkness or darkness itself being unseeable? So the most crucial question is whether we, in the experience of darkness, visually experience nothing or, conversely, are exactly seeing darkness?

3

When I hear something, what thing do I actually hear? Do I hear waterdrops, birds, sky, traffic? In an idealistic interpretation and contrary to the still prevailing realist-customary tradition, our auditory organ does not hear an objective thing, but instead, it is itself the creator of the object of hearing’s experiential content. In other words, there is no sound in the world, rather, it is my sensory organ that, by experiencing the external,

whatever it is (which according to Kant, I know not and cannot know what it is – Noumenon), compels the world to sound. But what is silence then, old Immanuel? Is noumenon soundless or is its sound, silence?

4

That which is, is! But what about the very Being itself? Is it the case that it is or it is not? If Being is, then is it itself one of the existents? As ridiculous as this? And if Being is not, how can things, via Being, be? At the beginning of *Science of Logic*, Hegel shows us how Being (such indeterminate Being) turns into “nothingness”. Nonetheless, the question that pertains to the primary problem of this writing fragment is, what about “nothingness”? Let us suppose that that thing which is not (some non-existent object for example), is not. But what about the very nothingness itself? Is it the case that it is or it is not? Is nothingness itself merely an abstract concept that we have created in contrast to Being? But how can a thing “be” opposite to Being at all? Or how even can a thing negate Being but itself “not be”? But if nothingness is nothingness, how even can nothingness be and not become nothing? Does nothingness, to be nothingness, must “not be”? In a word, neither the nothingness that is can be nothingness, nor the nothingness that is not. Analysis of this nothingness is possible only on an ontological level, and only by critical reconstruction of ontology itself as well. By breaking the rigidity of Being. Being contains in it nothingness, and nothingness contains in it Being.

5

Silence, like darkness, is of the nothingness type. In this sense, although silence is supposed to negate sound, this does not mean that silence is merely an abstract and hypothetical concept. Silence negates sound but precisely in an ontological realm. Silence is different from not hearing. Not hearing does not mean experiencing silence, but merely experiencing subjectively the absence of experience. On the other hand, silence is not the

experience of not hearing, but the experience of hearing nothingness. This has nothing to do with such and such hearing range of such and such creature. Nothingness of silence is neither subjective (abstract-sensory) nor objective (nothingness in itself), instead, in a world whose nature is relation, nothingness is in fact the collapse of relation and if we deem sound, of the relation type, silence is the negation of this sound, albeit ontologically. In a word, hearing silence is not negation of experience, but experience of negation.

6

Black hole is not unseeable due to not existing, instead, it is unseeable because it does not give in to any relation, not due to excessive poverty, but due to its excessive richness and lack of need for relation. It does not reflect any light and keeps it all to itself: But why is black hole, with such high density, with such richness, so ungenerous?! But what if black hole is not ungenerous? What if we find out that due to its excessive intensity and richness of existence, in truth it reflects darkness, and in this reflecting, in this giving, it is actually deeply generous?

7

The experience of hearing sound is due to the relation between the subjective and the objective. The sound itself does not exist in itself. Sound is the product of confrontation. That which in itself is, that which connects with the very in itself Being, that which resides beyond the duality of subject and object, is actually silence. Silence, due to excessive richness does not give in to sound. That which is, is silence. Sound is a temporary passivity, but silence is permanent, despite it all, contrary to assumptions, it is becoming and active. Silence is a type of action: to silent (سکوتیدن). Silence, due to excessive richness, does not give in to any passivity and because of this does not reflect any sound.

8

The experience of silence is not the experience of not hearing anything, but the experience of hearing the richest, fullest, and densest truth, that is, the experience of hearing nothingness: the experience of silencing silence. And hearing the sound of silence is not within the capabilities of just any eared animal. Hearing silence is a type of thinking about nothingness, a type of seeing darkness. Hearing silence requires purifying the ear from the sound of things, from all the nuisances that merely make noise so that silence is not heard.

9

The bandit lurking at the end of this path is a kind of deafening naturalistic romanticism. Hearing silence has nothing to do with the sound of nature or escaping from a swarming environment, or listening to the starry night of a desert. Hearing the noise of pre-civilization genies, is not hearing silence. Hearing the sound of silence, is the sublimating confrontation with nothingness itself in the intensity thresholds of its existence. It is at this moment that hearing the sound of silence drags one beyond knowledge, beyond Being, to the very unbearable fullness of nothingness: stepping inside black hole – experiencing living of death.